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Abstract
There is a controversy concerning whether to give Section 1.4.1 of
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature a skeptical or naturalistic reading. I
divide the overall interpretation of this section into seven smaller inter-
pretative theses, none of which alone determine either a skeptical or nat-
uralistic reading, but which together better support what has been called
the naturalistic interpretation.
How tedious to find oneself entering into a battle that is already raging, in
which corpses from both sides lie strewn across the battlefield, with one facing
the dreary prospect either of littering the ground with still more corpses or of
becoming another such corpse oneself. Yet some battles must be fought, one
might think, due to the great importance of the issues over which they are
fought, issues so consequential that one’s reputation or even one’s life would
be a small price to pay to further some great and noble cause. Indeed, what
cause could be greater or nobler than an interpretive issue in the history of
philosophy?
The issue before me is the interpretation of Section 1.4.1 of Hume’s Treatise
of Human Nature, entitled “Of scepticism with regard to reason”. The main
controversy most recently, it seems, centers upon whether to give this section a
naturalistic or a skeptical reading as part of a broader reading of the Treatise
as a whole. Robert Fogelin has characterized one of Hume’s arguments in this
section as a morass (Fogelin, p. 16), and the critical literature attempting to
navigate this morass seems itself to have devolved into a morass. I cannot
pretend to do justice to every interpretive argument that has been offered thus
far in recent years. Rather, my strategy in this paper is to refocus the debate
around seven definite interpretive theses, none of which alone I think demands a
naturalistic or skeptical reading of Hume in this section, though depending upon
which theses can ultimately be maintained and which will need to be revised, a
particular interpretation will seem to emerge from these theses.
In the interests of full disclosure, I will mention in advance that in general
I am far more interested in skepticism than in naturalism. Yet my aim in
this paper is to find skepticism in Hume just where it occurs, and nowhere
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else. Accordingly, the conclusion from the combination of the seven theses I
will present and defend seems best to support what has been presented as a
naturalistic interpretation of Section 1.4.1 of the Treatise, so it seems that any
skepticism in Hume must be found elsewhere.
Section 1.4.1 of the Treatise contains three main arguments. The first is
designed to show that “all knowledge resolves itself into probability” (T 1.4.1.4;
SBN 181), based upon a consideration of the uncertainty involved in adding large
numbers together. The second argument, which I will call the “diminution argu-
ment”, aims to show that reasoning must ultimately reduce the probability of its
own activities to zero, given the realization of the fallibility of the application of
the principles of reason. The third argument, which I will call the “complexity
argument”, shows how belief can occur in the face of the diminution argument,
based upon the mind’s inability to maintain attention throughout a long and
complex series of steps. I will focus on the second and third arguments in this
paper.
What I will continue to call the “naturalistic interpretation” for the sake
of convenience, even though it may not be a strictly accurate characterization,
holds that the diminution argument is a reductio ad absurdum argument in-
tended to show the inadequacy of an “intellectualist model of the rationally
reflective epistemic agent” (Morris, p. 56). The complexity argument, however,
shows how Hume’s conception of the role of reason in the production of be-
lief does not undermine itself in the same way as the intellectualist model. By
contrast, the skeptical reading holds that the diminution argument is intended
to be maintained as a skeptical argument deployable at any time, not merely
within the scope of a reductio ad absurdum argument, and the complexity argu-
ment shows how one retains any belief at all despite the looming threat of the
skeptical diminution argument.
The main difference in the interpretations, therefore, seems to be the scope
of the diminution and complexity arguments. Under the naturalistic interpre-
tation, the diminution argument applies only to the model of belief formation
that is under attack in the reductio ad absurdum argument, while the complex-
ity argument applies only to Hume’s own model of belief formation. Under the
skeptical interpretation, however, both the diminution and complexity argu-
ments can at least in principle be applied to any conception of belief formation.
I hope in the following seven theses to explore the details on which a view of
the scope of these arguments may be based.
1 The diminution argument is at least intended
by Hume to be part of a reductio ad absurdum
argument.
After presenting the diminution argument, Hume seems to disavow the results of
the argument, which would otherwise seem to make him a total skeptic. Instead
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he claims “neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of
that opinion” (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183), namely the opinion of total skepticism,
which raises the question why Hume would present an argument whose con-
clusion he does not maintain. He answers that it “is only to make the reader
sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes
and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly
an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (1.4.1.8; SBN
183, emphasis in the original). This pattern of discussion seems to embody the
structure of a reductio ad absurdum argument, just as Morris argues (p. 56),
since Hume presents an argument that seems to lead to a conclusion that he
denies, after which he indicates what he takes to be the faulty assumption in the
argument. Indeed, Hume continues to state what appears to be a recapitulation
of the reductio argument:
If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought, without
any peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of a force and
vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate
in a total suspense of judgment. But as experience will sufficiently
convince any one, who thinks it worth while to try, that tho’ he
can find no error in the foregoing arguments, yet he still continues
to believe, and think, and reason as usual, he may safely conclude,
that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner
of conception, which ’tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to
destroy. (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 184)
Even a critic of the naturalistic reading such as Kevin Meeker concedes that
the diminution argument at least superficially has the structure of a reductio,
though he claims that this structure “does not automatically rule out a sceptical
reading” (Meeker, p. 237). Some commentators have sought textual evidence
immediately after the diminution argument to show that the reductio structure
is merely superficial and that Hume intends the argument not to be restricted
to a view of reasoning and belief that he rejects.
David Owen, for example, points to a passage following Hume’s alleged con-
clusion under the reductio interpretation in which Hume seems not to restrict the
scope of his argument when he refers to “the very same principles” (T 1.4.1.8;
SBN 183) of reason that diminish evidence to zero. According to Owen, “there
is no suggestion that the reasoning itself, or some general account of reasoning,
is faulty” (Owen, p. 203). I may agree with Owen’s general point here, but it
seems to me that he misses the mark. Even if reasoning is not faulty, Hume’s
immediate target in the supposed reductio seems not to be the robustness of
some conception of reason, but rather the role of reason in the formation of
belief. When Hume seems to reiterate his reductio, the assumption he posits
is “If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar
manner of conception, or the addition of a force and vivacity” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN
184), not an assumption that reason was of a particular nature. On the basis of
Owen’s remarks, though, I may indeed wonder why Hume seems to think that
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his alleged reductio supports both his hypothesis that reasoning with regard to
cause and effect are a matter of custom as well as the hypothesis that belief owes
more to sensation than to cognition (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 183), whereas the reductio
proper seems to support only the second hypothesis. However, it seems to me
that Hume may hold that the second of the two hypotheses, concerning belief,
depends critically on the first, concerning reasoning about cause and effect, and
indeed he seems to make this connection in the statement he makes at the be-
ginning of the section, in which he claims “Our reason must be consider’d as
a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect” (T 1.4.1.1; SBN 180). If
the second hypothesis is supported by the reductio, then it seems as though the
first hypothesis on which the second depends is also supported, thus justifying
Hume’s presentation of the two hypotheses as one. Whether Hume is correct
about the dependency relations between the two hypotheses may be questioned,
as well as whether I am correct in interpreting Hume to be holding such a de-
pendency relation, but the supposition that Hume held the one hypothesis to
be dependent on the other would help explain how Hume can refer to “the very
same principles” of reason when the alleged reductio argument only immediately
affects the hypothesis concerning belief formation.
Owen and Meeker both point to another passage following the alleged re-
ductio, already quoted, to argue against restricting the scope of the diminution
argument (Owen, p. 203; Meeker, p. 235). There Hume claims that one “can
find no error in the foregoing arguments” (T 1.4.1.8, p. 184). According to
Owen, “these are not the words of someone who has just put forward a reductio
of a discredited theory of reason” (p. 203), and Meeker claims “if this argument
is simply an attack on the rationalist, then there obviously is an error: namely,
adopting the rationalist model of the understanding” (p. 235, emphasis in the
original). However, it seems to me that the passage cited needs to be interpreted
as falling within the scope of a conditional, namely “If belief . . . were a simple
act of the thought. . . ” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 184), meaning that there is no error
in the diminution argument under the assumption that belief were a simple act
of thought, which is what enables the conclusion of his reductio, rather than a
rejection of the argument due to internal errors on that assumption. There may
be an error in the argument on some different assumption, and I will argue later
that Hume demonstrates what such an error might be on the assumption of his
own conception of belief formation within the complexity argument. So it does
not seem odd for Hume to claim that there is no error in the diminution argu-
ment interpreted as a reductio, if Hume is in fact recapitulating the diminution
argument within the scope of an assumption that the reductio will ultimately
deny.
One may further wonder why, if the diminution argument forms part of a
reductio, Hume did not make this clear at the beginning of the argument, rather
than presenting the argument as though it were leading to conclusions that he
supported. This may simply be part of Hume’s peculiar stylistic and rhetorical
strategy. He may have wanted to put the reader into a state of panic by present-
ing what appears to be a solid argument leading to such distasteful conclusions
so that the reader would be more willing to accept the conclusion that Hume
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ultimately offers, namely that the argument depends upon an assumption that
needs to be rejected. As I will suggest later, given Hume’s own notion of belief
as relying essentially on a factor of vivacity, he may be manipulating the reader’s
own vivacity here in order to create beliefs in the reader that match his own.
It therefore seems to me that the explicit textual evidence that Hume intends
the diminution argument to be part of a reductio argument is stronger than the
evidence that the reductio structure is merely apparent, though I have certainly
not here addressed all the evidence that Owen and Meeker present. I am not in
a position to claim definitively that Hume’s reductio works, but I do not think
that the task of interpreting Hume in this section is furthered by envisioning
Hume’s intentions otherwise. Still, even if the reductio interpretation is adopted,
that alone does not resolve the issue with regard to a naturalistic or skeptical
reading of Section 1.4.1 as a whole. Consequently, I proceed to a consideration
of my remaining theses.
2 The fallibility that drives the iterative process
within the diminution argument functions not
against the subject’s assignment of probabil-
ity but against the subject’s repeated verifi-
cations of the original calculation and of those
verifications themselves.
A number of commentators on both sides of the controversy over a naturalistic
or skeptical interpretation seem to hold that the critical element of fallibility in
the diminution argument lies in the evaluation of the probability that the subject
assigns with regard to the subject’s calculation, namely that the subject may
be wrong in the appraisal of the probability of the calculation. Thus Fogelin
writes, “Then, following Hume’s instructions, we reflect upon our ability to make
such probability assignments” (p. 18). Mikael Karlsson claims, “The argument
can only work if we assume that the errors which we make in placing a given
degree of confidence in our probable judgements [sic] are more often than not
on the side of over-confidence” (Karlsson, p. 127). Michael Lynch picks upon
Karlsson’s suggestion: “There is just as much reason to think that I initially
gave P ‘too much’ confidence as there is to think I gave it ‘too little’ ” (Lynch,
p. 92).
I do not think that this interpretation fits well with Hume’s presentation of
the diminution argument. “In every judgment, which we can form concerning
probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the
first judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the object, by another judgment,
deriv’d from the nature of the understanding” (T 1.4.1.5; SBN 181–2). This
demand derives from a realization of the fallibility of judgment. I correct my
judgments in an effort to confirm them. Note that what is corrected is the first
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judgment about the object, not my assignment of probability to the judgment,
and what corrects the first judgment is another judgment, this time about my
understanding, not necessarily about the particular probability that is assigned.
In Hume’s later restatement of the diminution argument, in preparation for
the complexity argument, he makes it clear that what is re-examined in the first
confirmation step at least is the first judgment itself, not the appraisal of proba-
bility assigned to the first judgment: “I suppose, that afterwards I examine my
judgment itself, and observing that ’tis sometime just and sometimes erroneous,
I consider it as regulated by contrary principle or causes, of which some lead
to truth, and some to error” (T 1.4.1.10; SBN 184–5). However, on the subse-
quent steps, it may be wondered whether it is the appraisal of my assignment
of probability to the original judgment or the second judgment concerning the
first that is subject to iterative scrutiny. The text is not entirely unambiguous,
for example:
This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if
we wou’d closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a deci-
sion. But this decision, tho’ it should be favourable to our preceeding
judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still far-
ther our first evidence, and must itself be weaken’d by a fourth doubt
of the same kind, and so on in infinitum. . . . (T 1.4.1.6; SBN 182)
Is the subsequent decision an appraisal of the assignment of probability em-
bodied by the doubt, or it is an appraisal of the appraisal of the original judg-
ment and so forth? I think the text tends to support the latter interpretation,
in which the recognition of my fallibility prompts me to confirm my original
judgment with another judgment concerning the exercise of my faculties. Did
I make a mistake or did I not? Let me confirm my judgment. Yet my confir-
mation itself is another judgment in which my fallibility may be manifest, even
if this confirmation supports my original judgment, so yet another confirma-
tion is demanded and so forth. The need for continued confirmations indicates
merely that each prior confirmation, which contributes as evidence to the orig-
inal judgment, is only a probability, each subsequent probability diminishing
the probability of the prior confirmation until the confirmation immediately
following the original judgment has been reduced in probability to zero, thus
undercutting the evidence for the original judgment and requiring a suspension
of belief. This is how I interpret Hume’s diminution argument. The diminution
of probability he discusses can be understood best in terms of undermining an
entire chain of evidence.
In support of this interpretation, I appeal to the principle of charity against
the contrary reading. If interpreting the kind of fallibility that appears in the
diminution argument as applying to the assignment of probability leads to the
claim that Hume’s conclusions do not follow (Karlsson, p. 127) or to the claim
that Hume’s argument requires a complex reinterpretation in order for it to
resist criticism (Lynch, p. 94), then perhaps that interpretation is not what
Hume had in mind. I think that the interpretation of fallibility as applying to
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subsequent confirmation operations provides a chance for Hume’s argument to
succeed without much clever tinkering.
It may be wondered whether there is any significant difference in interpreting
the iteration as ranging over the assignment of probabilities or over successive
confirmations, since each confirmation may be seen likewise as establishing a
certain probability, and the evaluation of the assignment of probability may be
seen in turn as another confirmation. The critical difference between the two
is that the interpretation of the iteration over confirmations does not require
the recognition of any particular assignment of probability at all, whereas an
evaluation of my assignment of probability seems to demand the recognition of
a particular probability. The recognition of my fallibility does not entail that I
recognize some definite probability value, say something like a value of 0.8033,
where a value of 1 represents perfect certainty. Rather the recognition of falli-
bility with regard to my confirmation efforts requires only that I recognize the
probability to be something less than certain, not some specific degree of un-
certainty. On such grounds, I can proceed to perform subsequent confirmations
without any definite appraisal of probability. This seems to be an additional
merit of the interpretation of iteration over confirmations that the interpreta-
tion of iteration over assignment of probabilities seems to lack. Consequently,
it makes interpretations based on the consideration of whether I have assigned
my probability too high or too low seem idle, since the argument seems to
work under another interpretation without demanding that anyone ever assign
a particular probability value or level to a judgment.
One potential drawback to my preferred interpretation is that it seems to
require a hierarchy of probabilities, each level of which remains isolated from
the others, such that a diminution of probability at one level would not affect
the probability at another level, as Fogelin has argued (p. 18). Subsequent
interpreters following after Fogelin have labored long to save Hume from this
potentially fatal criticism (see, for example, Lynch, pp. 90–96), so my suggestion
here may appear to undo all that work. However, it seems to me that Fogelin’s
challenge may still be met under my preferred interpretation on the recognition
that the hierarchy of probabilities is not the independent hierarchy demanded
by the interpretation of iteration over assigned probabilities, but a hierarchy
of confirmations in a dependency relation of evidence according to a standard
epistemological sense of evidence, as I take Meeker to be arguing (pp. 224–
7). If I undercut my evidence at a higher level, it undercuts the probability of
that for which it serves as evidence, so given a chain of evidence, a weakening
of evidence at any level will ultimately affect the base level judgment which
was to be confirmed. Yet according to Hume’s argument, there is no level of
evidence here that is not weakened in this way, such that the cumulative effect
of this weakening will ultimately reduce the evidence for the original judgment
to nothing.
Whether Hume’s conclusion that the probability of any judgment will be
reduced to zero can be maintained on this evidential interpretation is a question
I leave open in this paper. Thus the tenability of this thesis may ultimately rest
on whether Hume’s conclusion can in fact be met. Yet such a demonstration
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would need to be careful about what assumptions Hume adopts in the argument,
such as whether he adopts a particular conception of the role of reason in the
production of belief, as considered in the previous thesis and again later, and
what Hume means by probability in the diminution argument, as I will consider
next.
3 If the diminution argument is a reductio, then
probability in that argument cannot be con-
strued solely in a Humean subjective manner.
Hume characterizes probability earlier in the Treatise as “that evidence, which
is still attended with uncertainty” (T 1.3.11.2; SBN 124). It seems tempting to
use this conception of probability in reconstructing the diminution argument,
and indeed in my own sketch of a reconstruction in the discussion of the previ-
ous thesis, I relied somewhat on the role that probabilities play as evidence in
the argument. However, it seems to me that if the diminution argument is in-
tended by Hume to be a reductio argument, he cannot rely solely on a subjective
conception of probability in terms of uncertainty.
The problem is that if the diminution argument does depend critically on
Hume’s own peculiar notion of probability, then the faulty assumption in the
supposed reductio argument may not be the rationalist conception of the role
of reason in belief formation, as Hume seems to argue, but it may be his notion
of probability that is responsible for the absurdity in the conclusion. For Hume
to persist in concluding that the rationalist conception of belief formation is
the faulty premise under those circumstances would seem to beg the question
somewhat against that rationalist conception by demanding that it be coherent
with Hume’s conception of probability, rather than some other conception of
probability that may be more congenial to it.
I am not absolutely certain that Hume in fact does not understand prob-
ability in the diminution argument according to his earlier characterization;
however, it seems to me that he cannot do so and still proceed with a reductio
argument, if indeed a reductio is his intention. This consideration may require
a reformulation of the diminution argument, including possibly my own recon-
struction above. However, it seems to me that it is possible to understand
probability in the argument by emphasizing the role of evidence in the argu-
ment rather than the notion of uncertainty. In fact, I think that there is reason
to think that Hume does understand probability in the diminution argument in
terms of evidence, as I will suggest in the consideration of a later thesis when I
address the issue of how many hypotheses Hume is entertaining in this section.
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4 Hume’s diminution argument is intended to
be descriptive not normative.
One peculiarity of Lynch’s reconstruction of the diminution argument is that
he construes it as a normative argument. Note the conclusion of his preferred
interpretation of the argument: “Hence I have no reason for thinking P as any
more probably than any other belief, (including not-P) and thus, assuming that
I recognize this, I should not believe P — I should withhold belief altogether” (p.
94, my emphasis). Lynch goes so far as to present the conclusion of an interpre-
tation of the argument derived from Fogelin as normative as well: “Assuming
that I recognize this fact, I should assign that probability to P straightaway,
and hence should not believe that P” (p. 91, my emphasis). Fogelin himself
does not seem to present the argument as a normative one, but of course Lynch
claims that the interpretation he presents is merely “similar to the one presented
by Robert Fogelin” (p. 91), not that he is presenting Fogelin’s interpretation
faithfully.
If the diminution argument is indeed a reductio, then Hume cannot be pre-
senting the argument as normative, since the absurdity would then only prop-
erly arise from a contradiction with another normative principle, such as that
we should not reduce probability to zero in every belief. Not only does Hume
not seem to offer any such normative statement in contradiction with the con-
clusion of the diminution argument, but such a normative statement would be
very odd for Hume to make in this context, given his notorious later complaints
about normative arguments based on descriptive statements (T 3.1.1.27; SBN
469). Rather his statements with regard to total skepticism that serve the role
of contradiction under the reductio interpretation seem decidedly descriptive:
“neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opin-
ion” (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183). It is not that no one should be such a skeptic, but
that no one is.
However, since I intended this thesis to be independent of the thesis con-
cerning whether the diminution argument is part of a reductio, I do not want
to decide against the normativity of the argument solely on the ground that
otherwise a reductio interpretation would fail. I note in passing, though, that in
presenting his reconstruction of the diminution argument as normative, Lynch
thereby takes up a strong position against a reductio interpretation (pp. 100–1).
Lynch himself offers no explanation of the normativity he sees in the diminu-
tion argument. Yet in reviewing the text of Hume’s conclusion of the diminution
argument proper, regardless of whether it plays a role in a reductio or not, I can
see some room for Lynch to make a normative interpretation. For example, in
the sentence, “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution” (T 1.4.1.6;
SBN 183), the word ‘require’ may be seen to have a normative force. Likewise, in
the sentence, “If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought . . . it must in-
fallibly destroy itself. . . ” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 184), Lynch may be reading the word
‘must’ as a normative claim, rather than as a claim of descriptive necessity. Yet
these readings seem particularly stretched in my opinion, compared with a more
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natural descriptive reading of these passages. Grammatically speaking, if there
is normativity in the two passages, then it applies to the rules of logic in the first
passage and to belief in the second, not to me, as Lynch’s interpretation would
have it. It could be argued that such normativity ultimately falls to me, given
my acceptance of the rules of logic and my possession of beliefs; however, given
such acceptance and possession, it is not clear that any further normativity is
required. These statements seem simply to be making a descriptive claim of
logical or nomological necessity, not any normative claim devolving upon me.
Still, Hume does start the diminution argument with a normative claim,
namely that “we ought always to correct the first judgment . . . by another judg-
ment” (T 1.4.1.5; SBN 181–2), so there may be no conflict with his notorious
later complaint concerning the introduction of an ‘ought’ claim on the basis of
prior ‘is’ claims (T 3.1.1.27; SBN 469). However, an argument beginning with
a normative claim does not require a normative conclusion, since there may
be factual consequences of normative claims if the normative principles cited
are understood to be implemented, and Hume needs the normative principle in
this case to be implemented in order for the diminution argument to proceed
even one step. Thereafter, though, it is not clear that there is any need for
introducing any normative consequences.
Consequently, I do not see much evidence for construing the diminution argu-
ment as normative rather than descriptive. Hume’s conclusion seems clearly to
be that probability does reduce to zero under the assumptions of the argument,
whatever they turn out to be, not that one should assign a zero probability in
any case of belief. Understanding the argument as fundamentally descriptive
does not preclude a skeptical reading, of course, since if probability does in fact
reduce to zero in every case, then it would seem to be the case that no one
really does believe anything or at least does not have any grounds for believing
anything. There may be room for normativity as a result of the diminution
argument, but it seems to me that any such normativity must be found after
the argument is recognized to be intended as a descriptive argument, as I will
argue.
5 The complexity argument works only with a
descriptive reading of the diminution argu-
ment.
If the diminution argument is understood as a normative argument, then it
seems to me that there is a problem with Hume’s description within the com-
plexity argument of how one avoids the situation described in the diminution
argument. The problem is that if the diminution argument is taken to be nor-
mative, then the argument does not seem to be complex at all, but depends
upon iterative steps that are the same each time. The mind does not seem to
have a problem subsuming any number of steps of an argument so long as the
steps are all the same, as Hume himself notes earlier:
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But as most of these proofs are perfectly resembling, the mind
runs easily along them, jumps from one part to another with facility,
and forms but a confus’d and general notion of each link. By this
means a long chain of argument, has as little effect in diminishing the
original vivacity, as a much shorter wou’d have, if compos’d of parts,
which were different from each other, and of which each requir’d a
distinct consideration. (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146)
Such is the case with the normative interpretation of the diminution argu-
ment. Since I know that each step is going to have the same results, then I do
not actually need to perform each step, and I may simply save time by assigning
the probability of zero to the original judgment without running through the
entire series, which I see will be unending. In fact, once I have become aware
of the diminution argument, I need not even bother performing the first step
of the argument; I can merely assign a zero probability to every judgment. I
do not need to consider any actual computations to appreciate the putatively
normative force of the diminution argument, and if I do not consider the actual
computations, the steps of the argument seem fairly simple. The iterative na-
ture of the diminution argument saves it from being too complex to follow by
subsuming a potential complexity in a simple repeated pattern.
The complexity arises when the mind must actually perform the iterative
steps, since even though the steps have the same form, their application to each
successive judgment is distinctly different, thereby stretching the mind not only
to perform the additional calculation but also to keep track of the role of the
particular calculation within the overall calculation. Only when the diminution
argument is understood as descriptive does this complexity arise. Then accord-
ing to Hume’s account, on each successive step the mind gets stretched farther,
such that the diminution of probability in each step has progressively less effect,
until there is a point reached at which the lessening impact of each step cancels
out the diminution of probability. So even if probability is diminished somewhat
in the first few steps, the diminution eventually stops, leaving sufficient vivacity
in the ideas to enable belief.
If someone insists upon a normative interpretation of the diminution argu-
ment, then it seems possible to understand the complexity argument as a direct
refutation of the diminution argument. If the diminution argument under a
normative interpretation applies to the complexity argument, then the diminu-
tion argument itself is complex, and therefore it fails because of its complexity.
The overall conclusion of the section following the complexity argument would
then be that one should not therefore assign a probability of zero to every judg-
ment, contrary to what the diminution argument holds, since the inability of
the mind to maintain attention through a long complex calculation will ulti-
mately result in a point at which the diminution will cease. One need only wait
for such a point in the calculation rather than jumping ahead and assigning a
probability of zero as the normative interpretation of the argument suggested.
However, in that case, how can anyone even follow a normative interpretation
of the diminution argument? Why is the mind not stretched even in following
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how the normative argument would go? Yet Lynch has provided three separate
normative interpretations of the diminution argument, and I assume that he
expects his readers to follow his interpretations. If the mind is not stretched
so far such that it can follow the argument sufficiently to understand its nor-
mative force, how is it stretched too far to maintain belief? Furthermore, these
argumentative consequences of such a normative interpretation seem hard to
reconcile with the passage earlier quoted in which Hume claims to find “no er-
ror in the foregoing arguments” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 184), as other commentators
have pointed out, or at least no error if understood as a conditional argument
as suggested earlier. It seems to me that if the diminution argument is under-
stood to be normative, then the complexity argument serves as a refutation of
the diminution argument. Yet if the complexity argument is a refutation of the
diminution argument, then the complexity argument must show some error in
the diminution argument, whether the diminution argument is understood as
part of a reductio or not, and Hume claims that there is no error.
Consequently, it seems most consistent with Hume’s text to treat the com-
plexity argument as applying to a descriptive interpretation of the diminution
argument. It remains now to identify what assumptions the complexity argu-
ment adopts.
6 Hume recognizes two different hypotheses that
may be tested against the diminution argu-
ment.
Hume presents the diminution argument twice, a circumstance not much noted
by other commentators. Directly after what appears to be the reiteration of
the reductio argument, under that interpretation, and before the complexity
argument, Hume restates the diminution argument in slightly different terms.
The question that prompts this restatement in preparation for the complexity
argument is “how it happens, even upon my hypothesis, that these arguments
above-explain’d produce not a total suspense of judgment, and after what man-
ner the mind ever retains a degree of assurance in any subject?” (T 1.4.1.9;
SBN 184). If the hypothesis mentioned in this passage, which is the subject of
concern in the complexity argument, is the same as the hypothesis used in the
diminution argument, as some have argued (see for example Lynch, p. 97, pp.
100–1), then why would Hume feel compelled to restate the argument, which
he had first presented just two pages earlier? Surely the reader will not have
forgotten the argument in such a short space. Furthermore, if there were only
one hypothesis under consideration in this section, why would Hume say “even
on my hypothesis” in the passage quoted above? Why would he not simply
ask how any belief can be sustained despite the diminution argument, which
purportedly already contains his hypothesis? It seems to me rather that Hume
is running the argument again on a different hypothesis concerning belief for-
mation than in the first presentation, a hypothesis that specifically entails his
12
own conception of probability.
The language Hume uses in the second presentation is somewhat different,
and it seems more reminiscent of Hume’s account of probability and belief than
the first presentation. Earlier Hume characterizes belief as follows: “Thus it
appears that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses,
is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present” (T 1.3.5.6; SBN
86). Whereas in the first presentation, Hume speaks blandly of evidence and
probability, in the second, Hume seems to expound more on the specific activity
of the mind in each step of the iterative process of the diminution argument:
“. . . I feel a stronger and more forcible conception on the one side, than on the
other. This strong conception forms my first decision” (T 1.4.1.9; SBN 184).
This characterization seems to rely critically on Hume’s own conceptions of
belief and probability in a way that the characterization of the same steps in
the first presentation did not. It is true that in the first presentation Hume
does claim, “Let our first belief be never so strong, it must infallibly perish by
passing thro’ so many new examinations, of which each diminishes somewhat of
its force and vigour” (T 1.4.1.6; SBN 183), but note the subtle difference in the
attribution of force between the two presentations. In the first presentation, a
belief has force and vigor, but in the second presentation the strong conception
is the decision or belief. The difference here may be too subtle to be decisive,
but it is sufficiently suggestive to my mind, in conjunction with the concern
about the repetition of the diminution argument, to indicate that Hume intends
to present the diminution argument again under his own hypothesis, whereas
the first presentation depended upon a different hypothesis.
7 The complexity argument does not work on
any conception of belief formation, but it does
work on Hume’s conception.
If the diminution argument is not a reductio, then it seems that it will operate
on any conception of belief formation, whether a purely rationalist conception
or Hume’s own conception. In that case, one might expect that the complexity
argument likewise will operate on any conception of belief formation, but I
claim that this latter view is mistaken. While the complexity argument does
work with Hume’s own conception of belief formation, it does not work with a
purely rationalist conception.
Meeker cites a later passage in which Hume refers back to his diminution
argument: “For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts
alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself. . . ”
(T 1.4.7.7; SBN 267). Meeker’s conclusion from this passage is as follows: “Once
again, note that Hume admits that it is the understanding alone that yields
these conclusions — not some silly rationalist view of the understanding” (p.
235, emphasis in the original). As I have argued above with regard to a similar
point made by Owen, I suggest that this statement of Meeker’s indicates that
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he has missed the point of those like Morris who claim that the diminution
argument is a reductio. It is not, as Meeker claims, a reductio against a particular
model of the understanding; it is a reductio against a particular model of belief
formation, as indicated in the earlier passage cited by Morris as the point of
Hume’s supposed reductio: “that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive,
than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 183). The rationalist
conception of belief formation that Hume seems to target is a model in which
cognition alone is sufficient to result in belief, whereas his own conception is
that belief requires a measure of vivacity derived from one’s sensitive nature in
addition to pure cognition. This is what Hume means in the passage Meeker
cites when he claims that the understanding alone subverts itself — he means
the understanding alone without the support of a factor of vivacity.
This consideration is important when considering the specific hypothesis
Hume evaluates in the complexity argument. Again, it seems to me that the
hypothesis in question is not a model of the understanding as such, but a model
of the role of cognition in belief formation. With this in mind, it seems clear
that the complexity argument will not work with a rationalist conception of
belief formation. If cognition alone is sufficient for belief formation, then the
stretching of the mind, its uneasy posture, and the diversion of its spirits that
Hume describes as part of the complexity argument (T 1.4.1.10; SBN 185) would
not serve to yield belief despite the diminution argument, since these are factors
which hinder cognition. If cognition is hindered in subsequent iterations of the
diminution argument, then the mind will not have validated the original judg-
ment. Consequently, it seems that it would require many fewer iterations of the
diminution argument to reduce the probability of the original judgment to zero,
according to the considerations that Hume presents in the diminution argument,
such that no one will believe anything after all, so long as one is considering
a purely rationalist conception of belief formation. None of the considerations
presenting in the complexity argument would thus stop the diminution, but
rather seem to encourage and hasten the diminution.
The complexity argument does work, however, on Hume’s account of belief
formation, since for Hume, vivacity plays the crucial role in belief formation
rather than mere cognition. The stretching of the mind noted in the complexity
argument does hinder subsequent cognitions, but it also reduces the effect of the
diminution of probability in those subsequent iterations, which under Hume’s
understanding of probability means that the diminution of the vivacity of the
original judgment is increasingly reduced until some point is reached at which
further iterations will not affect the vivacity of the original judgment. Since
this vivacity is what Hume credits most with the presence of belief, then the
remaining vivacity of the original judgment will be responsible for the belief in
that judgment. Note that Hume’s complexity argument under this interpreta-
tion also permits an invalidation of the original judgment, in a case in which the
diminution of probability in the early stages of correction of the original judg-
ment outstrips the stretching of the mind in subsequent iterations. Under other
interpretations of the relation between the diminution argument and the com-
plexity argument, it may be wondered how anyone could disbelieve something
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based on a complicated argument or proof.
Of course if I am wrong about the nature of the hypothesis that Hume is
testing in the complexity argument, if it is not his conception of belief formation,
but a particular view of the understanding or even the diminution argument
itself, understood as a skeptical argument, then this thesis merely provides a
curious side consideration to the interpretation of Hume’s skepticism with regard
to reason. However, combined with the previous thesis concerning the evidence
for two different hypotheses under consideration by Hume, this thesis suggests
that the purpose of Hume’s complexity argument is to defend his own hypothesis
about the mechanism of belief formation against the same kind of arguments he
offers against a rival hypothesis.
I have obviously used considerations from some theses to support other the-
ses at least in part, since if the theses are valid, then they need to stand together.
I claimed that none of the theses I present here alone demand a naturalistic or
skeptical reading of Section 1.4.1, but it seems clear to me that the seven the-
ses taken together support the naturalistic interpretation that Morris presents,
though possibly with some amendments. The way that these theses are coordi-
nated to yield the naturalistic interpretation is as follows:
The diminution argument is presented by Hume as descriptive rather than
normative, in which the iterative steps in the argument are to be understood as
being performed against successive confirmation of an original judgment, rather
than against one’s assignment of probability. The conclusion of the argument
is that as a result of the iterative steps there will be “a total extinction of
belief and evidence” (T 1.4.1.6; SBN 183), not that there should be such a total
extinction. Even as part of a descriptive argument, this extinction would count
as a form of skepticism; yet the diminution argument only works on certain
assumptions about belief formation, and Hume denies that anyone adheres to
this form of skepticism (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183). This argument is thus intended
by Hume to be part of a reductio argument against a different hypothesis about
belief formation than his own, namely a purely rationalist hypothesis in which
belief results purely from cogitative faculties without the influence of any factor
of vivacity, and accordingly he employs a different, more inclusive notion of
probability than his own in the diminution argument to make the argument
work on that hypothesis. Hume then presents the complexity argument to
explain how the pattern of argument in the diminution argument is not also
an argument against his own conception of belief formation, since his insistence
on the key role of vivacity in belief formation beyond mere cognition is what
prevents probabilities diminishing to zero. The end result of this section is a
vindication of Hume’s prior account of the nature of reason and belief against
the kind of erroneous skepticism that would result by virtue of the diminution
argument on a different account. This at least is the interpretation of Hume
to which the seven theses lead me. If I am wrong in this interpretation, then
perhaps either one or more of the seven theses will be wrong as well, or perhaps
I have not assembled the theses properly into a coherent whole.
I wanted to find skepticism just where it occurred in the Treatise and nowhere
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else. Section 1.4.1 does address skepticism in the diminution argument, but a
form of skepticism that arises only on an assumption of belief formation that
Hume does not hold. So despite its tantalizing title, this section does not address
any kind of skepticism that Hume himself holds. Rather it seems to me that
Hume’s own skepticism becomes manifest in the conclusion to Book 1 in Sec-
tion 1.4.7. However, that claim requires an additional investigation to navigate
through a different interpretive controversy.
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